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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
E. S. WILSON, 
Plaintiff, Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant. 
vs. 
WEBER COUNTY, a public corporation 
of the State of Utah, 
Defendant, Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No. 
6195 
The statement submitted by appellant, Weber 
County, is substantially correct so far as it goes, and 
inasmuch as appellant raises no question as to matters 
alleged and not stated, it is adequate to present the 
problem raised by appellant's appeal. There is, how-
ever, an additional question raised by the cross-appeal 
and we must state the facts out of which that question 
arises. 
The complaint, filed April 4, 1939, set out three 
causes of action. The appellant's statement relates only 
to the first. 
The second cause of action alleged that John Flet-
cher Scowcroft was at all times therein mentioned the 
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executor of the last will and testament of Joseph Scow-
croft, Deceased. As such executor, on August 27, 1931, 
and at the time of filing the inventory and appraise-
ment in the estate of said decedent, he paid the Weber 
County Clerk the sum of nine hundred seventy-seven 
dollars ( $977.00) pursuant to the requirements of Sec-
tion 2521, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, now appearing 
as Section 28-2-2, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. The 
said sum was paid over to the Weber County Treasurer, 
who received, held and used it for the benefit of Weber 
County. It is further alleged that nine hundred sixty-
seven dollars ($967.00) of said sum is in fact and law 
an ad valorem tax unconstitutionally attempted to be 
levied and was erroneously, illegally and unconstitution-
ally collected and received by the County. It is then 
alleged that on September 1, 1938, the executor notified 
the County Commission that said sum so paid was er-
roneously and illegally collected and demanded that the 
County Commissioners make an order for the refund 
thereof, but that the Commission failed and refused so 
to do. It is finally alleged that before the bringing of 
the action, the claim was assigned to the plaintiff. 
The third cause of action is similar to the second. 
It alleges a similar payment to the County officers in 
the sum of seventy-five dollars ($75.00) on April 4, 
1933, by the administrator of the Estate of Sidney 0. 
Stevens, Deceased, the illegal character of the collection 
upon the part of the County, the demand on March 6, 
1939, on the County Commission for an order of refund 
as to sixty-five dollars ($65.00) thereof, and the Com-
mission's refusal, and the assignment of the claim to 
plaintiff prior to filing the action. 
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The complaint prays for judgment for the sums for 
which demand was made, with interest from the date 
of demand. 
To the second and third causes of action the de-
fendant demurred upon the alleged ground that those 
causes were barred by Section 104-2-30, Revised Statutes 
of Utah, 1933. 
The Court sustained the demurrer pleading the 
statute of limitations to the second and third causes of 
a6tion. The plaintiff elected to stand on the complaint 
and refused to plead over, whereupon the Court entered 
judgment dismissing the second and third causes of 
action, with prejudice. From this portion of the judg-
ment the plaintiff cross-appealed, assigning as error 
the sustaining of the demurrers and the judgment of 
dismissal with prejudice. 
THE QUESTIONS 
Only two main questions are involved, but upon 
analysis, each in turn presents one or more subdivisions. 
In the hope that it may assist the Court, we have at-
tempted to present the questions logically analyzed and 
subdivided. 
They are: 
1. Does respondent's complaint state facts sufficient 
in its "first cause of action," to constitute a cause of 
action against appellant 1 
(a) Is an allegation of payment of the moneys 
under protest necessary to a complete and full allegation 
of said cause of action Y 
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(b) Is it necessary to allege the presentation and 
rejection of a claim against Weber County pursuant to 
the provisions of Section 19-11-10, R. S. U. 1933¥ 
2. Are respondent's second and third causes of ac-
tion on their face barred by the pr~visions of Section 
104-2-30 R. S. U. 1933~ 
(a) When does the period of limitation begin to 
run on respondent's causes of action~ 
( 1) Is prior demand a necessary part of re-
spondent's cause of action~ 
(2) If prior demand is a prerequisite to action, 
may a claimant indefinitely delay making demand¥ 
( 3) If the claimant may not indefinitely post-
pone the running of the statute by delaying demand, 
when will the period begin to run in the absence of a 
demand~ 
THE ARGUMENT 
FIRST QuESTION 
It seems to us too clear for argument that respond-
ent's first cause of action states facts sufficient to en-
title him to recover the tax which was admittedly col-
lected erronsously, illegally and in violation of our 
constitution. 
This Court held in Smith vs. Carbon County, 90 
Utah 560, 63 Pac. 2d 259, 108 A. L. R. 513 (second appeal 
in 95 Utah 360, 81 Pac. 2d 370), that ten dollars ($10.00) 
of the so-called ''inventory filing fee'' was in fact a fee, 
but (and we quote from the second opinion), "this Court 
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held that fees in excess of the m.mimum provided by 
statute for services in probate and guardianship pro-
ceedings ... are taxes within the operation of restrict-
ions imposed by the State constitution ... '' The entire 
tax was held unconstitutional, and the statute upon which 
such tax was based was held totally void. No portion 
of the tax was held valid. As the Court pointed out, the 
Legislature's characterization of the tax as a: fee did not 
affect its true nature. 
The case of Neilson vs. San Pete County, 40 Utah 
560, 123 Pac. 334, is exactly in point. It held that an 
allegation of payment under protest pursuant to Sec-
tion SQ-11-11, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933 (formerly 
Section 2684, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907) is not neces-
sary to state a cause of action under Section 80-10-17, 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933 (formerly Section 2642, 
Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907), for recovery of taxes 
illegally collected and received by a county. 
In the San Pete County case, this Court further held 
that a cause of action to recover a tax illegally collected 
is not a claim which must be itemized, verified, pre-
sented, and if refused, action brought thereon under the 
requirements of Sections 19-11-10 and 19-11-12, Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933. (Formerly Sections 531 and 
533 Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907), and an allegation 
of compliance with such sections is unnecessary in stat-
ing a cause of action under Section 80-10-17 Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933. It is perhaps well here to ob-
serve that Weber County did not plead Sections 19-11-10 
and 12 in bar. 
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The Respondent's complaint was modeled after the 
complaint considered in the San Pete County case, 
which was there held to state a cause of action, and con-
tains every allegation contained in the adjudicated 
pleading. We respectfully submit that the San Pete 
case is not distinguishable from this one, when this 
one is considered in the light of the Carbon County cases, 
supra, and that Respondent's complaint states facts 
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. 
In closing this section, perhaps the Court's atten-
tion should be called to the fact that only the general 
demurrer to the first cause of action is before this 
Court, as Appellant has not assigned as error the over-
ruling of the general demurrers to the 2nd and 3rd 
causes of action. 
SEcOND QuESTION 
The Respondent and Cross-Appellant's action was 
begun within four years of the payment alleged in the 
first, and after four but within eight years of the pay-
ments alleged in the second and third causes of action. 
As the limitation pleaded by the Appellant (section 104-
2-30, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933) prescribes a four 
year period, the question of the Bar of the Statute of 
Limitations is involved only in the second and third 
causes of action. 
It is the contention of Respondent and Cross-Appel-
lant that prior demand upon the County Commissioners 
is a necessary part of his cause of action and a pre-
requisite to the commencement of suit, and that the 
Statute does not start to run until demand. It is con-
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ceded, however, that the Statute may not be defeated 
by an indefinite delay in presenting a demand, and 
that the Statute starts to run, even without demand, 
within a reasotw.ble time after demt.md might have been 
made, i. e. within a reasonable time after payment. A 
reasonable time in such a situation, and in the absence 
of special or unusual circumstances, has been uniformly 
determined by the Courts to be a period equal to that of 
the limitation applicable. Thus, where demand is a 
prerequisite, an action is brought in time if demand is 
made and the action filed within double the period of 
the limitation after demand might first have been made 
-in this case, within eight years. 
With these rules the Respondent has complied. 
Neilson vs. San Pete County, supra, holds definitely 
that prior demand is an integral part of the cause of 
action, and a prerequisite to suit in a case such as this. 
This Court there said: 
''No doubt the taxpayer must, in some form 
notify the Board of County Commissioners that 
the County had no authority to collect the tax in 
question, and that it has no right to retain the 
same, and hence he demands or requests that the 
tax be refunded to him."-Utah Report, page 569. 
And again: 
''But we need not go, nor do we go, to the 
extent of holding in this case that taxes coming 
within the preview of section 2642 may be re-
covered back without first making a demand there-
for upon the County Commissioners. We think 
that the Statute implies such a demand from the 
fact that it authorizes the Board of Commission-
ers to order the refunding of the taxes.'' (Italics 
supplied.)-Utah Report, page 572. 
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Note also that the Court allowed legal interest, not 
from the date of payment, but only from the date of de· 
mand. If the caus~ of action had accrued as of the date 
of payment, interest would, of course, have been allowed 
from that time. Clearly the Court considered that the 
cause did not accrue until demand. 
Moreover, the Court has stated that point to have 
been adjudicated in the way Cross-Appellant contends 
for. At the time Neilson v. San Pete County was decided, 
this Court itself prepared the syllabi for its cases pur-
suant to Article VIII, Section 26 of the Constitution di-
recting the Court ''to prepare a syllabus of all the 
points adjudicated in each case" (Italics supplied). 
Here is what the Court says (in its 8th Syllabus) was 
adjudicated by that case: 
''A taxpayer who pays taxes illegally col-
lected within Compiled Laws, 1907, Section 2642, 
authorizing a refund of taxes illegally collected, 
must notify the Board of County Commissioners 
that the County receiving the taxes has no author-
ity to collect them nor right to retain them, and 
must demand a refund thereof, and on such a 
demand the Commissioners must adjust the mat-
ter and order a refund." (Italics again supplied.) 
In that case the Court reserved the question of 
whether the action must be commenced within four years 
from date of payment or within four years from date 
of demand. But we submit that, a demand being a part 
of the cause of action under the decisions, the general 
rule is that the Statute runs from demand, or, in the 
absence of demand, from a reasonable time after pay· 
ment within which to made demand. 
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The Utah Statute here involved makes this eveu 
clearer than the ordinary law. It reads (Section 104-2-
30, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933): 
''An action for relief not otherwise provided 
for must be c.ommenced within four years after 
the cause of action shall have accrued.'' (Italics 
supplied.) 
As the cause of action is not complete until demand, 
the Statute by its terms does not start until then. 
The applicable rule is succinctly stated in Ban-
croft's Code Pleading, Practic~ and Remedies, Ten Year 
Supplement, Volume 1, pages 1475-6: 
"Where a demand is necessary before a cause 
of action arises, the Statute does not begin to run 
until such demand is made, provided, however, 
that the demand or other necessary condition be 
made or performed within a reasonable time, 
generally regarded as coincident with the period 
of limitation.. '' 
And it is said in Bancroft's Code Practice and 
Remedies, Volume 1, page 515, (Section 323), 
"* * * a right of action may be barred before it 
has ever accrued, as in case of an obligation matur-
ing only after demand where no demand has ever 
been made. The Statute in such case would com-
mence to run upon the expiration of a reasonable 
time within which demand should have been 
made." (Citing cases. The italics are supplied.) 
Again, as to the time of making the demand, it is 
said in 37 C. J. 965, 
"Again, it is held that, where there is nothing 
to indicate an expectation that a demand is to 
be made quickly, or that the parties contemplate 
10 
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an indefinite delay, the time limited for bring-
ing the action should be treated as the time within 
which the demand should be made, at the ex-
piration of which the Statute will begin to run 
* * * the demand being presumed to have been 
made at that time, and this has been declared to 
be the view adopted by the majority of the Courts 
and in the better considered cases.'' 
Numerous decisions are cited in support of the text. 
Moreover, as late as March of this year this Court, 
in a well reasoned decision (the opinion by Mr. Justice 
Wolfe) held that, while ordinarily a cause of action for 
a debt accrues and the Statute begins to run when the 
debt is due and payable, still, when some controlling 
Statute provides that an additional thing be done be-
fore action may be brought, the Statute does not begin 
to run until the time when the additional thing has 
been done and the action may be maintained. The case 
is 
State Tax Commission vs. Spanish Fork 
-Utah-, 100 Pac. 2nd 575. 
The Court there held that, where a taxpayer fails 
to make a return and pay sales tax due the State, the 
Tax Commission must make a return for him, and assess 
the tax in administrative proceedings before it may 
maintain an action to collect the same, even though the 
tax was, under the law, due and payable years before. 
The Court then held, as a corollary to the above rule, 
that the Statute of Limitations did not begin to run 
until after the Tax Commission had filed the return 
and made the assessment. 
11 
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It is to be twted that ·m that case a period lot1-ger 
than the Statute had run as to a large portion of the 
claim (which was a series of monthly accumulations) 
before the Tax return was evet,. f'iled. And still this 
Court permitted the plaintiff to recover. 
We submit that the case is exactly in point, and is 
controlling here in favor of this plaintiff's contention. 
One of the best discussions we have found of the 
theory behind the cases on this subject is contained In 
the editorial comment in an annotation in 
32 L. R. A. (N. S.), page 486 et seq. 
The annotator makes a very careful analysis of the 
various factual situations, and of the various solutions 
which have been presented, and clearly points out the 
logical fallacy behind each solution except the one we 
urge upon the Court. The logic and justice of the theory 
we contend for is there, we think, clearly demonstrated. 
We respectfully urge a most _careful reading of that 
editorial comment. 
Many other Courts have reached the conclusion we 
· urge upon this Court. From the decisions, not wishing 
to burden the Court, we have tried to extract those cases 
only which most exactly duplicate the facts at bar, ad-
ding only one or two in closely analagous situations 
where the general rules applicable are considered. 
The case of 
Johnston vs. Keefer, 
280 Pac. 324 (Idaho, 1929), 
is exactly in point. There the plaintiff had purchased 
stock from Defendant on March 1, 1919, on Defendant's 
12 
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promise to repurchase the stock on demand. No ef-
fective demand was made until February, 1926. Upon 
refusal of the demand, the action was filed in August 
of 1926 to recover the purchase price. A four year 
Statute of Limitations was pleaded in bar. The Idaho 
Court held that the action was begun in time, as the 
Statute did not begin to run until March 1, 1923. In 
disposing of the issue thus raised, the Court said (page 
325, et seq.) : 
"It has come to be a quite general rule that, 
if an act on the part of a creditor, such as a de-
mand or notice, be necessary as a condition prece-
dent to his cause of action, such demand must be 
made within a reasonable time; the theory being 
that one in whose favor such a liability exists 
cannot defeat the purpose of the statute by an 
unreasonable delay in the making of the demand, 
and that a reasonable time within which to make 
demand is, by analogy, the period which is fixed 
by the statute of limitations. 
"It has been been held that, when no time is 
fixed for the making of a demand, it will be pre-
sumed to have been made in a reasonable time, or 
at the expiration of the period within which the 
statute would have run upon the claim if it had 
been due from its date, and the statute is then set 
in motion. 25 Cyc. 1207, 1208; 1 Wood on Limi-
tations (4th Ed.) p. 617; Keithler v. Foster, 22 
Ohio St. 27; 17 R. C. L. p. 757; Emerson v. North 
America Transp. & T. Co., 303 Ill. 282, 135 N. 
E. 497, 23 A. L. R. 1, 6; Thompson v. Whitaker 
Iron Co., 41 W. V a. 57 4, 23 S. E. 795 ; Smith v. 
Smith, 91 Mich. 7, 51 N. W. 694; Massie v. Byrd, 
13 
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87 Ala. 672, 6 So. 145; Daugherty v. Wheeler, 125 
Ind. 421, 25 N. E. 542. 
"(5, 6) If it were accepted as the rule absolute 
that a 'reasonable time' for making demand is 
in all cases the period fixed by the statute for the 
bringing of an action on the claim or liability-
and the rule is by no means inflexible-it becomes 
apparent that the instant action was commenced 
in time, taking into consideration the presump-
tion of a demand within the statutory period. 
The statute of limitations involved is C. S. Sec-
tion 6610, prescribing a four-year period for the 
commencement of 'an action upon a contract, 
obligation or liability not founded upon an instru-
ment of writing.' The contract was entered into 
March 1, 1919, and, applying a four-year period 
as a reasonable time within which to make de-
mand for its performance, that period expired 
March 1, 1923, immediately after which the statute 
would begin to run against the action, requiring 
it to be instituted by March 1, 1927. The action 
was commenced in August, 1926, thus bringing 
it within the time allowed under the application 
of the rule above referred to.'' 
In the case of 
Espanda vs. Ogden State Bank 
75 Utah 117, 283 Pac. 729, 
decided in 1929, this Court announced a rule which, like 
the rule announced in State Tax Commission vs. Spanish 
Fork, supra, goes even farther than it is necessary to 
go in holding that plaintiff's action here is timely. That 
was an action upon a certificate of deposit issued in 
1912, and payable on presentation twelve months from 
date. No demand was made until a few days before the 
14 
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suit was brought on August 3, 1927. The Court, choos-
ing to base its decision equally on two grounds (the 
second of which was the lack of a Statute applicable to 
a bank), said, 
"The defendant's plea of the Statute of limi-
tations must also fail. The plaintiff had no cause 
of action against the defendant until he demanded 
payment of the certificate, and hence the Statute 
of limitations did not begin to run until that 
date.'' 
The case of: 
Andrews vs. Andrews, Admr. 
212 N. W. 408, 51 A. L. R. 
542 (Minn. 1927), 
is in point. It was a suit on a note, dated in 1905, and 
payable on actual demand. No demand was made until 
after the maker's death in 1924, when a claim was filed, 
and suit brought upon its rejection. The administrator 
pleaded a six year Statute in bar, and the trial Court 
submitted the case to the jury under an instruction to 
find for the plaintiff if it found that a reasonable time 
within which to demand payment had not expired more 
than six years prior to the maker's death. The Supreme 
Court of Minnesota approved this action, holding that 
the lapse of a reasonable time for making demand merely 
starts the Statute runing from the date on which a 
reasonable time terminates. 
Other cases exactly in point, and adopting the 
theory here contended for are: 
Daugherty vs. Wheeler 
25 N. E. 542 (Ind.) 
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Keither vs. Foster 
22 Ohio State Reports 27 
Thompson vs. Whitaker Iron Company 
23 S. E. 795 (W.Va.) 
Dean vs. Iowa-Des Moines National Bank & 
Trust Co. 290 N. W. 664, 128 A. L. R. 137 (Iowa, 
1940) 
O'Hair vs. United States Fidelity & Guarantee 
Co. 49 Pac. 2nd, 1129 (California District Court 
of Appeal First District 1935. Hearing denied by 
Supreme Court November 29, 1935). 
Additional cases treating of the general subject are : 
Williams vs. Bergin 
47 Pac. 877 (California) 
County of San Luis Obispo vs. Gage 
73 Pac. 174. 
Spencer vs. City of Los Angeles 
179 Pac. 163. 
West Texas Utilities vs. Ellis. 
102 S. W. 2nd 234 (Texas 1937) 
Before we leave this part of our Brief perhaps we 
should point out that if it be contended that under the 
doctrine announced in the State Tax Commission case, 
supra, the running of the Statute may be indefinitely de-
layed, the answer is, as was suggested by the Court 
there, that the obligor may at any time take steps to 
determine his obligation either by paying the obligation 
if it is admitted or by bringing an action under the 
provisions of Section 104-54-14 ~vised Statutes of 
Utah, 1933, just as the tax payer in the Tax Commis-
sion case could have filed his return and thus started 
the Statute running. 
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However, it is not necessary that the Court here 
apply as liberal a rule as that one announced in the Tax 
Commission case and in the Ogden State Bank case, 
supra, because the plaintiff's action was here brought 
within four years after the lapse of a reasonable time 
for the presentation of his claim, as a reasonable time 
is determined in the ordinary case by the authorities 
hereinbefore cited. 
In this case it may also be fairly said that the 
plaintiff here had a very reasonable and just excuse for 
delay in niaking his demand for the reason that until 
the Smith vs. Carbon County cases, supra, were decided 
by this Court, he, with almost everyone else in the 
State of Utah, was laboring under a mistake as to his 
antecedent legal rights in believing that the tax un-
constitutionally exacted by the Counties was, in fact, 
a valid fee for services rendered. Certainly it hardly 
seems equitable to allow the Counties, as sub-divisions 
of the State, unconstitutionally to extract monies from 
their citizens and then, because it has succeeded in hold-
ing its ill gotten gains for a period of four years, to deny 
the citizens a remedy to recover that which is lawfully 
their own. Many Counties have, since the Smith vs. 
Carbon County cases, been voluntarily paying claims 
of the type here contested by the defendant Weber 
County. We think Weber County should be compelled 
to pay all three of the plaintiff's claims. 
For the reasons stated it is respectfully submitted 
that the trial Court did not err in overruling defend-
ant's demurrers to plaintiff's first cause of action and 
in rendering judgment upon that cause in favor of 
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plaintiff and that the plaintiff's first cause of action 
does state facts sufficient to justify the relief granted. 
It is further respectfully submitted that the trial Court 
did err in holding that plaintiff's second and third 
causes of action were barred by the provisions of Sec-
tion 104-2-30 Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, and in 
entering judgment dismissing said cause of action and 
that this Court should affirm the lower Court's judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff and should reverse its 
judgment dismissing plaintiff's second and third causes 
of action and remand the case with instructions to take 
appropriate procedure upon plaintiff's second and third 
causes af action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THATCHER & YouNG, 
Attorneys for E. B. Wilson, 
Plaintiff. 
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